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I 
l. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN TEEPLES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
DON CHOQUETTE, 
Def enda1Ytt, 
JUDGE MEL HUMPHERYS, 
Garnishee, Respondent. 
Case 
No.10324 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant Lynn Teeples appeals from a judgment 
of the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, Third Ju-
tlicial District, denying the appellant a garnishee judg-
ment against the respondent Mel Humpherys, a Jus-
tice of the Peace in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Tlte District Court of the Third Judicial District 
ruled that the appellant was not entitled to a garnishee 
1 
judgment against the respondent for bail mouey wliiC'li 
the respondent held in his capacity as a justice of the 
peace and ·which he returned to the defendant in a erimi-
nal case, who had apparently deposited the money with 
him. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent contends that the Third Distriet 
Court's ruling, denying the appellant a garnishee jmlg-
ment, should be affirmed. 
STATEI\IENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statemeut of 
facts: 
On February 21, 1964, the appellant Lynn Teeples 
filed a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County against Don Choquette in Case No. 148411. The 
plaintiff prayed for $4,000 damages, $1,500 pnnifoe 
damages, and attorney's fees in the sum of $730. 
On the same day, an affidavit of the appellant was filecl 
in support of attachment proceedings before judgment 
(R. 1 through 3). On the 21st day of February, 1964, the 
appellant obtained a garnishment order from the clerk of 
the court to Justice Mel Humpherys (R. 4), directing the 
respondent not to pay any debt due or to become clue to 
the defendant Don Choquette (R. 4). On July lG, 1964, 
Judge Humpherys filed a return on the garnishment, re-
citing that he was not in any manner indebted to the 
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tlefcndnnt, nor did he have any chattels in his possession 
or know of other rights or credits due or to become due. 
On the 21st day of July, 1964, the appellant filed a 
tm'erse to the garnishment return, alleging that on in-
formation aud belief, Judge Humpherys was indebted to 
the <lefendant in the sum of $445 (R. 11). Subsequently, 
a rr•i]uest for admissions was made and on the 30th day 
nf September, 1964, J uclge Humpherys, acting through 
the comity attorney, replied to the admissions that prior 
to tl1e time the garnishment was served, he had received 
a check from the Brigham City Court in the sum of $500, 
\rhirh represented the bond of the defendant in the case 
of State 0f Utah v. Don Choquette, which was then pend-
ing hefore Judge Humpherys (R. 15). 
Subsequently, a pretrial order was entered (R. 17 
a11d 18) which recited that ·when the garnishment was 
~c1Tec1, Judge Humpherys was holding the sum of $500 
as bail and that subsequent to the service of the gar-
nishmrnt, Don Choquette 's case was brought on for dis-
position and he was sentenced to pay a fine of $50. After 
applying part of the bail money in satisfaction of the 
fine, the $450 remaining was returned to the clef enclant. 
On January 29, 1965, Judge Hanson entered judg-
ment, denying the appellant a garnishee judgment 
a~'<iinst Judge Humpherys. Judge Hanson ruled that 
1'1nsmuch as the garnishment had been served on the 
~2nd clay of February, 1964, when the case against Don 
l'hoquette ·was still pending, the ans>vers to the interro-
~ntorie:;; in the garnishment were properly anS"wered in 
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the negative; and since the criminal case against Don 
Choquette was not determined until February 26, 1964, 
a garnishee judgment would be improper. 
Everything in the record supports the conclusioll 
that respondent held the funds in question as a justice 
of the peace and that he ·was operating as a dulv consti-
tuted, judicial officer in a criminal case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A GAR-
NISHEE JUDGMENT, SINCE: 
(a) TO HA VE GRANTED A GARNISHEE 
JUDGMENT WOULD HA VE BEEN 
CONTRARY TO JUDICIAL IMMU-
NITY. 
(b) THE RESPONDENT ACTED IN AC-
CORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY 
MANDATE. 
(c) A BAIL DEPOSIT IN THE HANDS OF 
A MAGISTRATE IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
GARNISHMENT FOR ATTACHMENT 
PURPOSES WHERE THE LIABILITY 
OF THE DEPOSITOR REMAINS CON-
TINGENT. 
( d) BAIL ON DEPOSIT WITH A JUDICIAL 
OFFICER MAY NOT BE THE SUB-
JECT OF GARNISHMENT. 
4 
(a) It is a well-established rule that judges are not 
civilly liable for acts performed as part of their judicial 
Lluties. In 30A, Am. Jur., Judges, Section 73, it is stated: 
"It is the general rule that where a judge has 
jurisdiction he is not civilly liable for acts done 
in the exercise of his judicial function.'' 
In Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah 12, 33 Pac. 224 (1893), 
the Territorial Supreme Court ruled that a justice of 
the peace, acting within his jurisdiction and in good 
faith, is not civilly liable for acts performed in such 
capacity. The court noted that a justice of the peace 
is not liable for mere errors in judgment and could not 
necessarily know a judicial fact until a full hearing on 
the issue ·was heard. 
In Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P. 2d 242 
(1943), this court, without reference to the Marks de-
cision, ruled that a justice of the peace, acting as a mag-
istrate, when exercising a judicial function, is not liable 
for damages occasioned by his actions. Further, the 
law has generally recognized that it is immaterial 
11hether the judge is of an inferior court or a superior 
C'Ourt. 48 C.J.S., Judges, Sec. 63b. 
In the instant case, the respondent is a constitu-
tional officer. Being a justice of the peace, he is cloaked 
11ith the judicial power of the State of Utah. Article 
\1II, Section 1, Constitution of Utah. His involve-
ment in the present case was as a judge, and the gar-
nishment that was served upon him was served upon 
him, not as an individual, but as a judge or justice of 
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the peace. At the time of the receipt of the garnish-
ment, the respondent had in his possession only a chi_ 
posit in lieu of bail. At that time, it was necessary for 
him to determine whether or not a bail deposit, receiver! 
under the circumstances evident in this case, could he 
the subject of a garnishment. At the time the gar-
nishment return was received, the criminal case, pe!Hl-
ing before the justice, had not been determineu. Fur-
ther, subsequent to the time the case was determined, 
the justice was required to exercise his judgment as to 
whether or not the statutory mandate, requiring him to 
return the bail deposit to the defendant, should be com-
plied with or whether the garnishment request should 
be honored. In making a determination in accordance 
with the statutory mandate, as will appear below, a 
judicial function was involved. 
It is well settled that a garnishment proceeding, 
when it involves a state officer, absolves the sovereign 
state and its officers from suit. 114 A.L.R. 261. Tl1is 
being so, and it appearing that the respondent in the 
instant case acted in a judicial capacity, it is apparei1t 
that a garnishee judgment may not now be entered 
against him. 
(b) In the instant case, a bond was not deposited 
with the justice of peace, but rather a deposit instead of 
bail was made in accordance with Section 77-43-19. 
U.C.A., 1953. Subsequent to the determination of the 
criminal case pending against Don Choquette, the re-
spondent had no other alternative but to comply 'rith 
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the statutory mandate in cases where a deposit in lieu 
of bail has been made. Section 77-43-21, U.C.A., 1953, 
provides: 
"vVhen money has been so deposited, if it re-
mains on deposit at the time of a judgment for the 
payment of a fine, the clerk must, under the di-
rection of the court, apply the money in satisfac-
tion thereof, and after satisfying the fine and 
costs, must refund the surplus, if any, to the de-
fendant." (Emphasis added) 
The respondent, therefore, was compelled by statute 
to subtract court costs and the fine imposed against Don 
Choquette, and return the rest of the deposit to Mr. Cho-
! quette. Had he failed to comply with that statute, he 
may have been violating a duty imposed by statute and 
thus be liable to Don Choquette. 
The provision of the Utah statute is similar to 
Section 1297 of the California Penal Code. In Mundell 
r. Wells, 181 Calif. 398, 184 Pac. 666 (1919), a suit was 
brought by an assignee of money deposited with the 
clerk of a magistrate in a criminal case. Subsequent 
to disposition of the case, the court applied the bail 
money in satisfaction of the fine and paid the remainder 
orer to the defendant rather than the assignee. The 
court ruled that the clerk acted properly in dispensing 
; the money to the defendant. The court cited Section 
1297 of the California Penal Code, requiring the refund-
ing of the surplus of any deposit to the defendant. The 
court noted that as between the contesting parties, a de-
termination in equity may sometimes be made but cited 
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Way v. Day, 187 Mass. 476, 73 N.E. 543, for the propo-
sition that no claim could be made against the sovereign 
that bail money should be turned over to any third 
person. 
In Wright and Taylor v. Daughterty, 138 Iowa HJ.'i, 
115 N.W. 908, the court held that money deposited as 
bail could not be reached by judgment creditors by 
garnishee proceedings following the dismissal of au iu-
dictment. The court said that the bail statute in Iowa 
only required the court to hold the money for bail and 
for satisfaction of any fine imposed, and did not require 
it to honor any other claims. The Utah statute is Rimi-
lar to Section 765.4 of the Iowa Code of 1950. 
Since the statutory mandate states that the clerk 
or court "must" refund any surplus to the defendant, ii 
is obvious that the court in this case could not be held 
liable for complying with the statutory requirement. 
(c) Rule 64(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, al-
lows garnishment prior to trial, and it is, of course, rec-
ognized that the debt need not be due at the timP lhe 
garnishment for attachment purposes is serYed. Ho\1-
ever, it is well settled that under Utah law, the liability 
of the garnishee to account to the clef enclant must 1Je 
absolute at the time the garnishment is serncl. Thus, 
in Acheson-Harder Co. Y. Western Wholesale Notio11s 
Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 Pac. 1032 (1928), it is stated: 
"It is one of the cardinal principles of the law 
of garnishment that the garnishee is under no 
greater liability to the plaintiff in whose behalf 
the writ of garnishment is issued than such gnr-
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nishee was under to the defendant immediately 
before the writ was served. The liability of the 
garnishee to account to the defendant for prop-
erty or indebtedness must be absolute, in order 
that such property or indebtedness is garnishable. 
Shinn on Attachment and Garnishment, vol. 2 
§ 643, p. 1059. A fortiori it follows that accounts 
placed in the hands of the garnishee for collection, 
but not collected, cannot be reached by the service 
of a writ of garnishment upon the person having 
such accounts in his hands for collection. To reach 
such assets of the defendant, the one indebted to 
the defendant must be served with the writ. Rood 
on Garnishment, § 167, p. 202; 28 C. J. § 201, 
p. 160.'' 
In the instant case, it is obvious that at the time 
the garnishment was served, the liability for the return of 
any bail was not absolute: (1) It was speculative whether 
or not the defendant would in fact appear for trial and 
whether or not the bail would have to be forfeited. (2) 
The amount of the fine to be imposed, if any, was still 
not ascertained. 
It is apparent that at the time the garnishment was 
served upon the respondent, his liability to the def end-
ant was not absolute. Therefore, the court acted properly 
in 111ling that no garnishee judgment could be entered. 
(d) The appellant cites a case from North Carolina 
for the proposition that the proceeds, returnable to the 
defendant, may be attached by garnishment when they 
are in the hands of a justice of the peace. White v. Or-
dille, 229 N.C. 490, 50 S.E. 2d 499. That case is no 
preredent for the instant appeal. First, the opinion 
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does not hold that a garnishee judgment may be enteretl 
against the officer, but involves only a contest betwee11 
the depositor and his creditors. Second, it does not ap-
pear that North Carolina has a statute similar to Sec-
tion 77-43-21, U.C.A., 1953, which would compel the 
return of deposited moneys to a defendant. Thin1, the 
North Carolina case involved only the question of attach-
ment and garnishment of the residuary portion of the 
deposit and did not concern itself with the issue of 
whether or not a garnishment served before the residuary 
part is in fact determined, can be the basis for an attach-
ment by garnishment of the said residuary part. 
Nothing in Utah law allows an attachment by gar-
nishment of bail on deposit in a criminal case, nor is there 
any provision which allows a garnishee judgme11t to be 
entered against a judicial officer. Although the rules of 
civil procedure allow a garnishment to be served upon a 
"corporation, private or public," nothing in the rules 
mentions a judicial officer nor could the rules authorize a 
garnishee judgment against a judicial officer, since sucli 
an authorization would be substantiYe rather than pro-
cedural, and outside the court's rule-making power. 
Further, Rule 64D ( p), Utah Rules of CiYil Proced-
ure, appears to he contrary to the appellant's position. 
That rule governs the situation where property is hchl 
to secure the performance of some other obligation. The 
rule provides that if personal property is held for au:· 
other purpose than to secure the payment of mone:r, it 
is subject to garnishment only if the plaintiff seeking 1he 
garnishment could perform the condition for whiC'h tlw 
10 
deposit is held. In the instant case, the bail was held 
to guarantee the appearance of the defendant in a crimi-
nal case. This is an obligation that could not have been 
performed by the plaintiff. Consequently, the property 
under the rules could not be the subject of a garnish-
ment. It may be argued that the term "personal prop-
crtr" in Rule 64D(p) does not contemplate money. How-
erer, the spirit of the rule would seem to be applicable 
iu the instant situation. 
Sound judicial administration should keep a court, 
at whatever level, free of becoming a party to creditors' 
elaims or disputes. To allow bail to be the subject of 
garnishment or attachment is fraught with serious dan-
gers and could greatly undermine the dignity of the 
courts. It is submitted that as a consequence, bail on 
deposit ·with the judicial officer should not be deemed 
the subject of a garnishment. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, it is apparent that the trial court 
acted properly in refusing the appellant a garnishee judg-
ment. The trial court's ruling can be sustained on nu-
merous bases, not the least of which is sound public pol-
icy. It is submitted that this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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